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ANTITRUST ISSUES RAISED BY THE EMERGING
GLOBAL INTERNET ECONOMY
David S. Evans*

INTRODUCTION
Web-based businesses are increasingly the subject of antitrust concerns. Plaintiffs in the United States have sued eBay for tying its online
payments service to its transaction service.1 Multiple jurisdictions in the
European Community have claimed that Apple has violated the competition
laws by limiting the ability of its music player to play music from competing music stores and limiting the ability of competing music players to play
music purchased from its music stores.2 During 2007, although the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission decided not to block Google’s acquisition of
DoubleClick after a lengthy investigation, it expressed its intent to “closely
watch these markets” involved in online advertising.3
Of course, competition policymakers have not just discovered the web.
In 1998, shortly after the start of the commercial internet three years earlier,
the U.S. Department of Justice and various states filed an antitrust case
against Microsoft for engaging in various practices related to web brows-
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1
See, e.g., Malone v. eBay, Inc., No. 07-01882-JF (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 4, 2007).
2
Free-DRM Music By iTunes, But EC Starts Official Investigation, EDRI.org, Apr. 12, 2007,
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.7/ituned-free-drm; Increased Competition Pushes iTunes Towards
Interoperability,
Forbrukerombudet,
Feb.
11,
2008,
http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/index.gan?id=11038653 (link); Helena Spongenberg, Apple’s iTunes
Risks EU Backlash After Norway Ruling, EU Observer, Jan. 25, 2007, http://euobserver.com/871/23334;
Apple: European Consumer Organisations Join Forces in Legal Dispute Over iTunes Music Store, Verbraucherzentrale, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.vzbv.de/go/dokumente/571/8/36/index.html (link); Consumer Council of Norway, Complaint against iTunes Music Store (Jan. 25, 2006),
http://forbrukerportalen.no/filearchive/Complaint%20against%20iTunes%20Music%20Store.pdf (link).
3
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of FTC Concerning Google/DoubleClick, Dec. 20, 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf (link).
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ers.4 The European Commission started an investigation of Microsoft’s
practices related to media players that stream music over the internet in
2001.5 However, the Microsoft cases mainly involved the use of the company’s market power in personal computers to influence competition in
web-based markets that threatened it. The matters involving Apple,
Google, and eBay concern market power in web-based products and services themselves.
The internet economy is likely to raise antitrust concerns—and possible demands for regulation—for years to come. Global gargantuan firms
have emerged, which will likely attract scrutiny by competition authorities
and by policymakers concerned with competition issues. The companies
mentioned above, for example, have shares in putative antitrust markets that
rival those held by Microsoft.6 Apple has more than a 70 percent share of
paid music downloads in the European Union,7 Google has more than an 80
percent share of search queries in Europe,8 and eBay has more than a 90
percent share of auction site page views in France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
and the UK.9
Competition authorities and private parties can challenge the practices
of these leading firms under the antitrust laws of most jurisdictions. Such
challenges are especially likely under European Community law and decisional practice which impose special obligations and significant scrutiny on
firms that have market shares as low as 40 percent.10 Moreover, many web4

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld in 2001 portions of a lower court ruling in 2000 that
found Microsoft guilty of violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C.
2000)).
5
In 2007 the European Court of First Instance upheld the Commission’s 2004 decision that Microsoft has violated Article 82 EC by tying its media player software to its dominant operating system. See
T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL 2693858 (Sept. 17, 2007).
6
These are not necessarily relevant antitrust markets but they are ones that competition authorities
could plausibly adopt.
7
See Anna Jenkinson & Don Jeffrey, Apple, Record Companies Restrict Music Sales, EU Says (Update6),
Bloomberg.com,
Apr.
3,
2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aiMdS7KddG14&refer=europe (link).
8
COMSCORE, MYMETRIX QSEARCH 2.0 KEY MEASURES REPORT (Dec. 2007). comScore is a
“global Internet information provider” that gathers data on internet usage trends. comScore Who We
Are, http://www.comscore.com/about/default.asp (link). comScore’s data analyses are based on its
panel of over two million users. Id. In recruiting its panelists, comScore attempts to ensure that “[a]ll
demographic segments of the online population are represented in the comScore Global Network, with
large
samples
of
participants
in
each
segment.”
comScore
Methodology,
http://www.comscore.com/method/method.asp (link).
9
COMSCORE, MYMETRIX KEY MEASURES REPORT (Dec. 2007).
10
See British Airways, PLC v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 211, 223–25 (finding British Airways dominant in the context of Article 82 with a share of 39.7%, notwithstanding evidence that its
share had declined from 46% over a seven year period).
The finding in British Airways relied heavily on the fact that the rest of the market was very fragmented. See id. ¶¶ 211–25. This was the first time that a firm with a market share below 40% was

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/13/

286

102:285 (2008)

Antitrust Issues

based firms have complex business models and arrangements. Separating
the merely complicated from the nefarious will take courts and competition
authorities time to sort out. This Essay describes the economics and technology behind the web-based economy and how these features will influence internet competition policy in the years to come.
Section I provides a birds-eye view of the web-based economy. Although this sector is evolving quickly, its contours are beginning to take
shape and we can be reasonably confident that several globally dominant
firms will play significant roles. Section II describes the economics of the
web-based economy. The key businesses are what economists call “multisided platforms” that serve several distinct but interdependent customer
groups. Google for example serves people who are searching the web, advertisers who want to reach these users, and application developers who are
using Google’s software to develop complementary products. The leading
multi-sided platforms for the web are often built on “software platform”
technologies that make portions of their code available to software developers who write applications that benefit users of the software platform. Section III considers the competition that arises in the web-based economy.
The appearance of dominant firms in key sectors will ensure ongoing scrutiny, and the nature of the economics and technology of these businesses
will result in ongoing disputes over their practices.
The web economy poses two major challenges to competition authorities. The law and economics for analyzing the multi-sided platforms that
dominate the internet sector is not well developed. At the same time the
web-economy is evolving very rapidly and in ways that are sure to result in
antitrust complaints and investigations. Competition authorities and courts
will need to exercise great care in balancing the protection of consumers
from anticompetitive behavior against causing harm from interfering in
complex businesses that are both rapidly moving and not fully understood.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WEB-BASED ECONOMY
The internet refers to computer networks that are linked through wired
and wireless connections and that interoperate through standard communication protocols. This global communication system provides access to
various software-based services. The most important set of services on the
internet is the world-wide web, which consists of digital media linked

found to be dominant. Subsequently, in Wanadoo Interactive, the Commission concluded that Wanadoo
did hold a dominant position, though it only had a market share of 39%. Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision of July 16, 2003, ¶ 227 (link). The Commission reached this finding both based on the
size and strength of Wanadoo’s main competitors, who all had markets shares in between 6.5% and
16%. The Commission reached this finding both based on the size and strength of Wanadoo’s main
competitors, who all had markets shares in between 6.5% and 16%. Id. The issue of thresholds for finding dominance was not examined further by the CFI in Case T-339/04 France Télécom SA v. Comm’n,
2007 E.C.R. II-00521 (2007).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/13/

287

NO RT HW E ST E R N U NI VE RSI T Y L AW RE VI E W C O L L OQ UY

through hyperlinks and uniform resource locators (“URLs”).11 For simplicity, this Essay refers to the internet as the physical communication system
and to the web as all products and services that rely on this communication
system.
The key innovations behind the internet started occurring in the early
1960s, and the key innovations behind the web came in 1989.12 The commercial web began roughly in 1995 with the introduction of browsers that
made web navigation easy for regular computer users; this therefore encouraged the formation of businesses geared to a mass audience. There was
much prognostication in the late 1990s on how the web would evolve, and
enormous optimism that it would lead to quick fortunes as network effects—more users make a site more valuable which leads to more users—
propelled early entrants to monopolies.13 Those hopes were seemingly
dashed in 2001, when the market caps of most web-based firms plummeted
and vast numbers of these firms vanished.14 It became apparent that many
of these firms had not developed business models that allowed them to
make money from the visitors who came to their sites. In the aftermath of
the burst bubble, though, a robust web-based economy has emerged that is
creating completely new services, from social networking to behaviorally
targeted advertising, and also disrupting many traditional businesses from
media to telephony.15 As we will see below, advertising revenue for delivering traffic has become the major driver for a significant portion of the
web economy.
A large portion of the population in industrialized countries touches the
web-based economy daily. In 2007 55 percent of the population in the
European Union16 and 71 percent of the population in the United States had
11

Other internet services include online gaming, Voice-over-IP, email, instant messaging, file sharing, and other communication services. Most of these services are bundled into websites.
12
See David C. Mowery & Timothy Simcoe, Is the Internet a U.S. Invention?—An Economic and
Technological History of Computer Networking, 31 RES. POL’Y 1369, 1371–76 (2002).
13
See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 13 (1999) (“When the value of a product to one user depends on how many other
users there are, economists say that this product exhibits network externalities, or network effects . . . .
Technologies subject to strong network effects tend to exhibit long lead times followed by explosive
growth. The pattern results from positive feedback: as the installed base of users grows, more and more
users find adoption worthwhile.”) (emphasis in original).
14
See, e.g., Suzanne McGee, New Economy Sours on Venture Capitalists, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
2001, at R.6; Easy.com easy.gone, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2001, Special Section, A Survey of the New
Rich, at 6–9; Living in Freefall, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 117–18.
15
See Reply All Blog, Is ‘Web 2.0’ Another Bubble?, WSJ.com, Dec. 27, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116679843912957776.html (link).
16
Internet
World
Stats,
Internet
Usage
in
the
European
Union,
http://internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm, (last visited Apr. 19, 2008) (link). Population penetration is
defined as the number of Internet users divided by the total population of the region. An Internet user is
defined as “anyone currently in the capacity to use the Internet,” namely, that he has access to an Internet connection point and can use the technology. Internet World Stats does not adjust the figures to exclude children, illiterate people, or any other segment of the population.
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access to the internet.17 In December 2007, 78 percent of all internet users
in the United States and 69 percent worldwide used webmail;18 39 percent
of all internet visitors in the US and 47 percent worldwide used instant messaging.19 According to a year 2007 survey of Americans who frequently
used the internet, 84 percent used a search engine.20 The same survey found
that the average respondent spent 33 hours per week on web products and
services in 2007 compared with 16 hours viewing television.21
Web-based products and services are consumed primarily through the
personal computer, which is the primary internet-connected device in most
countries.22 However, it is widely expected that most mobile phones around
the world will soon be connected to the internet.23 This increased portability will increase the amount of time people can access the web because
people usually have their mobile phones with them all the time. It will also
increase the use of web-based products and services in lesser developed
countries because mobile phones are less expensive than personal computers and more widely held.24
One must be modest in speculating on the future evolution of the web.
The internet and the web are very new technologies by historical standards.
17
Internet World Stats, Internet Penetration in North America: Nov. 2007,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm#north, (last visited Apr. 19, 2008) (link).
18
comScore
Media
Metrix,
data
for
December
2007,
available
at
http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/more-what-if-data-issued-on-yahoo-microsoft-combo3362/ (link) (follow “In the email category, Yahoo mail leads both in the US (82 million visitors) and
worldwide (257 million visitors)” hyperlink).
19
Id. (follow “A Microsoft/Yahoo combined instant messenger audience of 298 million would
reach nearly 77% of the instant messenger audience worldwide.” hyperlink) (link).
20
IDC, U.S. ONLINE CONSUMER BEHAVIOR SURVEY RESULTS 2007, PART I: WIRELINE INTERNET
USAGE 1 (2007) (on file with author).
21
Id. at 52.
22
The major exceptions are Korea and Japan, where many consumers use their mobile phones to
connect to the internet and where sophisticated web-based mobile phone services have been introduced.
See Michael Fitzpatrick, Why Mobile Japan Leads the World: A Combination of an Urban Lifestyle and
Infrastructure Advantages Mean that the Fixed Internet is Being Left Behind by the Mobile, THE
GUARDIAN,
Sept.
27,
2007,
at
Tech.
News
&Features
3,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/sep/27/guardianweeklytechnologysection.mobilephones
(link).
23
See, e.g., Press Release, Ipsos, Mobile Phones Could Soon Rival the PC As World’s Dominant
Internet
Platform
(Apr.
18,
2006),
available
at
http://www.ipsosna.com/news/act_hit_cntr.cfm?id=3049&Region=us&PDF_name=mr060418-1b.pdf (link); Press Release, comScore, Mobile Phone Web Users Nearly Equal PC Based Internet Users in Japan (Sept. 20,
2007), available at http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1742 (link); see also Darren Waters,
Why
the
Future
is
in
Your
Hands,
BBC
News,
Feb.
18,
2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7250465.stm (link).
24
See id. Also, cell phone unit shipments were nearly 1.2 billion units in 2007 while the number of
PCs shipped globally was just over 270 million. See Ann Steffora Mutschler, SIA: 2007 global chip
sales
up
modestly
by
3%
to
$256B,
EDN.com,
Feb.
1,
2008,
http://www.edn.com/article/CA6527975.html?industryid=47037 (link); Press Release, Gartner, Gartner
Says Worldwide PC Market Grew 13 Percent in 2007 (Jan. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=584210 (link).
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One could not have reliably forecasted the development of electricity at a
similar vantage point during its development. The recent dot.com bust
teaches how wrong smart and financially motivated people can be about the
business prospects of a new technology. Nevertheless, five features of the
web-based economy appear to have emerged that are critical for understanding how this industry will evolve, the competitive strategies used in
this sector and their implications ultimately for antitrust policy.
Many web businesses follow the traditional advertising-supported media model. Content is used to attract traffic. Access to that traffic is sold to
advertisers. The content is usually made available for free so that advertising is the primary source of revenue and profits. Many of the leading web
properties follow this approach.
Table 1 lists the top ten sites in the United States based on the number
of pages of those sites that are viewed by visitors. All but three of these
sites are primarily supported by advertising; Amazon and eBay are funded
through transaction mechanisms while Wikipedia is funded by voluntary
donations.
Table 1: Top 10 Properties (U.S.) January 2008.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Property
Total Internet Audience25
Yahoo! Sites
Google Sites
Microsoft Sites
AOL LLC
Fox Interactive Media
eBay
Amazon Sites
Wikipedia Sites
Time Warner - Excluding AOL
Ask Network

Unique Visitors
(in thousands)
184,239
138,059
134,886
119,297
109,442
83,752
78,789
59,003
55,589
52,645
52,102

Source: Press Release, comScore, comScore Media Metrix Releases Top 50 Web
Rankings for January (Feb. 18, 2008) at Table 3, available at
http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2067 (link).

Google and Ask primarily sell advertising on their search results pages.
AOL, Fox, Microsoft, Time Warner, and Yahoo primarily sell advertising
on their various web properties. The emergence of the advertising25

Properties include all of the sites owned by an entity, including search engines, international sites
and sites acquired. For example, ‘Google Sites’ include google.com and other international homepages,
search pages for specific categories such as news and images, applications such as Gmail, Google Maps
and Google Earth, and sites owned by Google such as Picasa and YouTube.
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supported media model for websites is one of the most significant changes
since the dot.com bust and is the revenue source behind what is sometimes
called Web 2.0.
Transaction platforms play a key role. The web has resulted in the development of a number of transaction platforms which reduce the costs of
connecting buyers and sellers and consummating trades between them.
These platforms earn most of their revenues and profits from transaction
fees.26 For example, although eBay began by helping consumers sell second-hand goods to other consumers who wanted to buy those goods, it has
evolved into a broad platform for connecting consumers and businesses.
Other e-commerce sites, such as Amazon have started moving from directly
selling merchandise on their own behalf to providing a platform for connecting businesses and consumers.
Social networking is a critical innovation. Social networking has
emerged as a new form of communication and interaction among individuals. MySpace, for example, has attracted 69 million users worldwide who
post information about themselves on the site and use it to stay in contact
with friends and to make new acquaintances. A related phenomenon is that
a great deal of the “content” on the web is generated by users. Although
sites such as YouTube, as well as MySpace and Facebook, rely on advertising to make money as traditional media firms do, they expend few resources on actually creating or purchasing any content themselves—they
focus mainly on inducing others to provide this content.
Demand and supply-side scale economies tend to lead to certain segments of the web being dominated, on a national and often global basis, by
a few large firms.27 On the demand side, some web-based platforms create
more value for each customer as they obtain more customers. A transaction
platform such as eBay, for example, is more valuable to buyers because it
has more sellers and more valuable to sellers because it has more buyers.
26

These transaction platforms usually have integrated payment platforms. eBay has PayPal,
Alibaba has AliPay, and Google’s commerce site has Google CheckOut. In 2007, 25 percent of eBay’s
net transaction revenue came from the use of its payment platform, PayPal, rather than its auction platforms and communications segment (for example, Skype).
27
A demand-side scale economy results when a product or service becomes more valuable as more
people use it. Demand-side scale economies result from direct and indirect network effects. In the case
of direct network effects, “the benefit to a network user depends directly on how many other users are
hooked up to the network.” In indirect network effects, “the benefit to a user arises indirectly because
the number of users of the network affects the price and availability of complementary products.” See
DENNIS W. CARLTON AND JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 392–393 (4th
ed., 2005). Supply-side scale economies result when the long-run average total cost of providing a good
or service fall as the quantity of output increases. Id. at 36–40.
The mere fact that a firm has a large share of a segment does not necessarily imply that it has scale
economies or network effects and in fact some of the shares discussed below are likely the result of the
fact that these firms were just better than their rivals. However, for the reasons discussed below it is apparent that indirect network effects, and to a lesser extent cost-based scale economies, are important for
these businesses.
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Moreover, buyers and sellers appreciate being able to reach others across
borders.
On the supply side, some web-based platforms—Google, for example—also incur significant fixed costs in developing and maintaining their
software platforms and in acquiring computer server and storage capacity
for their activities. The average cost of providing products and services is
lower for larger platforms, which can amortize these fixed costs over a larger customer base. Demand and supply-side scale economies result in larger firms being able to offer greater value to consumers at lower costs, as
discussed in more detail below. These scale economies do not necessarily
result in a monopoly but they do tend to limit the number of viable firms in
a segment.28 In some segments, it is in fact unclear how many viable firms
will remain and whether they will evolve towards monopoly.
Web-platforms support many web firms. These giant global web-based
firms provide platforms for other web-based businesses. They make software services available so other businesses can provide complementary services. For example, the music service iLike.com and the online Scrabble
platform Scrabulous are two of the most popular Facebook applications,
raising the value of the Facebook platform as a whole. Google makes its
popular mapping software available to developers who are writing applications based on Google’s maps. Web-platforms also provide services that
these businesses rely on. Many web-based small businesses depend on auction sites such as eBay or e-tailers such as Amazon to make sales. Most
blogs rely on Google to sell ad space on their sites to advertisers who want
to reach blog viewers.29 These web-platforms are examples of the multisided platforms that we describe in more detail below. The web-based businesses that rely on these platforms provide complementary products and
services that make the web platform more valuable and help drive revenue
to it.
II. THE ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF WEB-BASED BUSINESSES
A. The Economics of Multi-sided Platforms
Many of the key businesses that have arisen on the web are what
economists call “multi-sided platforms.”30 A multi-sided platform provides
28

As firms become larger indirect network effects and scale economies from further expansion may
diminish and congestion and managerial economies may counter the other benefits from size. Furthermore, multiple firms may coexist in a segment despite indirect network effects and scale economies if
they can differentiate their products and services from each other.
29
See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
David
S.
Evans
to
Catalyst
Code,
http://www.thecatalystcode.com/theconversation/blog/2007/08/06/economics-of-the-blogosphere/ (Aug.
6, 2007) (link).
30
Multi-sided platforms are also called “two-sided markets” by economists even though they are
not markets—at least as markets are defined in antitrust. See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole,
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goods or services to two or more distinct groups of customers who need
each other in some way and who rely on the platform to intermediate transactions between them.31 Multi-sided platforms usually lower transactions
costs and thereby facilitate value-creating exchanges. They tend to arise
when there is some value available from getting multiple sides together but
transactions costs or other obstacles stand in the way. eBay, for example,
drastically lowered the cost of exchange between buyers and sellers of second-hand goods.
Multi-sided platforms usually perform each of three interrelated core
functions to some degree.32 First, they serve as matchmakers to facilitate
exchange by making it easier for members of each group to find each other.
That can be for love (matchmaker.com) or money (eBay). Second, they
build communities (or audiences) because this makes it more likely that
members of a group will find a suitable match. Facebook provides value in
part because people are more likely to find people they want to meet and
because advertisers can reach a large audience. The value of the platform
grows as the audience grows. Third, they provide shared resources and reduce the cost of providing services to multiple groups of customers. This is
an especially important characteristic of software platforms discussed below.
One key feature of multi-sided platforms is the presence of the “indirect network effects” mentioned earlier.33 That means that the value that a
customer on one side realizes from the platform increases with the number
of customers on the other side. Consumers looking to buy something value
a search engine more if it provides advertisements that are more relevant to
their search, while companies value advertising on a search engine higher if
they are more likely to reach potential consumers.
Another key feature is that multi-sided platforms must cater to multiple, distinct customer groups simultaneously. To establish a two-sided platform, for example, the founders must solve a chicken-and-egg problem:
customers on Side A will not participate without customers on Side B, but
customers on Side B will not participate without customers on Side A.
YouTube had to pursue people who want to post videos, people who want
Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole,
Two-Sided Markets]. Most web-based businesses are at least two-sided because they are transaction
platforms (such as eBay, Amazon, Alibaba) which connect buyers and sellers, social networking sites
(such as MySpace and Facebook) which connect friends, of advertising-supported sites (such as
cnn.com as well as the social networking sites) which connect viewers and advertisers.
31
See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 20 YALE J. REG. 325, 328
(2003); David S. Evans, Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries, 2 REV. NETWORK
ECON. 191 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J.
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003).
32
See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with TwoSided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 158–59 (2007).
33
See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON.
PERSP. 93 (1994).
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to watch videos, and advertisers who want to reach these viewers. These
features make the profit-maximizing calculus for a multi-sided platform
more intricate than for a traditional business. A firm operating one of these
platforms must consider the demands of all sides, the interrelationships between these demands, the costs directly attributable to each side, and the
costs of running the platform.
Further complicating this calculus is the fact that the profit-maximizing
prices for multi-sided platforms can result in users on one side getting a
price that is less than the incremental cost incurred by a customer on that
side, and even less than zero.34 The side that is “needed more” or that is
“harder to get” may receive a price break; conversely, the side that gets the
most value out of access to members of the other side likely bears more of
the cost.35 As an empirical matter, many multi-sided platforms make their
money from one side and make access to the platform available to another
side for a price that does not cover the cost of provision.36 Facebook, for
example, is free to users and makes money by selling advertising.37
There are several major classes of industries in which most if not all of
the businesses are based on multi-sided platforms. These include advertising-supported media including newspapers, magazines, radio, television;
payments including credit and debit cards; exchanges including auction
houses, commodity exchanges and financial exchanges; and dating and
matchmaking such as singles bars and matchmaking services. Another major class consists of industries that have software platforms as their underlying technology.38 These include computer operating systems, mobile
telephones, personal digital assistants, and video game consoles.39 They
also include many web-based businesses.
B. Software Platforms
A software program is a “platform” if it provides services that other
web software can rely on. Typically a software platform includes modules
of code that other software programs can access through application programming interfaces (“APIs”). By relying on these APIs software developers can obtain services that enable them to write software programs that are
complementary to the software platform and useful to those who rely on the
34

See Rochet & Tirole Two Sided Markets, supra note 30, at 659; Mark Armstrong, Competition in
Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668–70 (2006); Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494, 1498
(2005).
35
See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CATALYST CODE: THE STRATEGIES BEHIND
THE WORLD’S MOST DYNAMIC COMPANIES 71–92 (2007).
36
When there are more than two sides, at least one side must make money. Id.
37
See About Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/about.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2008) (link).
38
See generally DAVID S. EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, INVISIBLE ENGINES:
HOW SOFTWARE PLATFORMS DRIVE INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2006).
39
See id. at 1–2.
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software platform. By relying on Facebook’s APIs, Scrabulous provides a
game for Facebook users and thereby makes Facebook a more valuable social networking site for those users.40
Historically, a major type of software platform consisted of operating
systems that run on personal computers or on servers that are nodes in an
organization’s network of computers. Software applications such as Microsoft Word that ran on operating systems were also installed on these desktop or server computers.41 The software platforms that are central to webbased businesses reside on servers that are attached to the internet. Moreover, applications that work with these platforms may reside on other servers that are attached to the internet. This has resulted in what is sometimes
called “cloud” computing, in which the software platform, and possibly the
application, primarily resides on several interchangeable computers that the
individual user accesses through the internet. Google’s search-based advertising platform is an example. The search engine that individuals use to
conduct search queries, much of the software that advertisers rely on for
advertising campaigns, and much of the software that publishers rely on for
inserting advertisements into their web pages, reside on vast interconnected
but indistinguishable “server farms” that Google operates around the world.
C. The Interconnected Web Ecosystems: The Example of Google
The economics and technology of web-based businesses has resulted in
an ecosystem that consists of interconnecting multi-sided platform businesses—based on software platform technology—that provide services to
each other, to many other web-businesses that depend on them, and to consumers. This pattern can be seen by starting with Google’s advertising platform and considering the businesses that are connected to that node. The
relationships are shown in Figure 1.

40

The owners of Scrabble have objected to this take off on their game. See Heather Timmons,
Scrabble Tries to Fight a Popular Imposter at its Own Game, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2008, at C7, available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/technology/07scrabulous.html?scp=1&sq=scrabulous&st=nyt
(link).
41
Operating systems are a type of software platform that manipulates the computer hardware in addition to providing code that supports other software and hardware applications.
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Figure 1: Google’s advertising platform connections.

Google’s advertising platform enables companies to insert ads based
on keywords used in a search query, in which case the ad appears on the
search-results page, or based on the keywords found in a website that belongs to Google’s network of web publishers.42 Google’s search engine
makes money by drawing traffic to its search-results pages, where it sells
and places advertising. That search engine also helps people find webbased businesses—including publishers and e-tailers—that are not paid advertisers. Those businesses benefit from Google’s search engine, but
Google does not charge them for being listed in the organic search results
that appear on the left-hand side of the search-results page. Google also
provides advertising services to web publishers. Those publishers make
space available for Google to insert ads; Google sells that space to advertisers and pays the publishers a portion of its ad revenues.
Many of the entities that Google interconnects with are also multisided platforms. Web publishers operate two-sided platforms in which they
use content to attract viewers and sell access to those viewers to advertisers.
Many small publishers, including blogs, rely entirely on Google to sell their
advertising space. Many large publishers use Google to sell some portion
of their advertising space; some of them also have Google search boxes and
receive payments from Google for advertising revenue that results from
42

See David S. Evans, The Economics of the Online Advertising Industry (Jan. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript at 37), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086473 (link).
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their visitors clicking on ads on Google’s search results pages. Social networking sites are similar to web publishers in using advertising to make
money. The site attracts traffic by providing social networking and makes
money by selling that traffic—and data related to individual users—to advertisers through platforms such as Google. Google’s advertising platform
also intersects with eBay’s transaction platform. eBay buys advertising on
Google’s search results pages to obtain leads to various products and services on eBay. In addition, eBay makes advertising space available to
Google and receives payments in return.
Google makes its APIs available to software developers that are writing programs to provide other services. In return, Google reserves the right
to insert advertising on those services. Since January 2007, developers
have written around 20,000 “gadgets”—mini-applications that use the
Google Gadgets API and can run on Google platforms (e.g. Google Calendar, iGoogle—a personalized Google homepage, Google Desktop, Blogger,
Google Maps, Orkut), which can be embedded in any webpage, and can run
on other third party applications (e.g. MyAOL)—which are used across
100,000 Web sites. Developers can also create map applications on their
websites using the Google Maps API. For example, using the Google Maps
API, Orbitz added “Orbitz Updates” to its site, a map which shows realtime user-reported weather, traffic, parking, and wait-line conditions at U.S.
airports.
D. Scale and Dominance in the Web-Based Economy
The economics and technology of web-based businesses has resulted in
the emergence of companies that have substantial shares in their categories
in many countries globally.43 These shares are partly the result of scale
economies in production and indirect network effects for these multi-sided
platforms.

43
I am using the term “category” to refer to commonly known types of products or services such as
social networking, portals, instant messaging, and auction-sites. These categories do not necessarily
correspond to markets because products and services in one category can substitute to some degree for
products and services in another category. Moreover, the extent of cross-category substitution can vary
over time; for example, in my experience people are increasingly using social networking sites such as
Facebook as their entry point when they sign on to the web rather than a traditional portal such as Yahoo.
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Table 2 reports data on the two largest platforms in three representative
categories:44 online auctions, search-based advertising, and social networking for a number of countries.45 These categories are highly concentrated in
every country. Moreover, the search-based advertising and online auction
categories are dominated by the same firm in most countries for which data
are available. eBay is the largest auction site, with over 90 percent share of
this category in all of countries for which individual data are available.
Google is the leading search-engine provider with a share in excess of 80
percent in 7 out of 16 countries for which data are available and a share in
excess of 50 percent in 12 out of 16 countries. Social networking does not
have a single leader although the leading social networking site has more
than a 50 percent share in most countries for which there are data.46

44

I have chosen these three because, as discussed below, they reflect the most important types of
platforms for the foreseeable future. However, the same basic points apply to instant messaging, online
payment systems, and web mail.
45
These categories do not necessarily correspond to relevant antitrust markets and any analysis of
market definition should properly consider the two-sided issues mentioned above. As noted below,
these shares are based on categories as reported by comScore and may over or understate the true significance of the leading companies. First, the shares of the main search engine providers (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and Baidu) are understated because comScore includes searches that are done within
websites such as eBay in its calculation of search shares, even though eBay is not generally used for
internet searches. Second, the calculation of search query shares further understates the search revenue
share for Google because Google earns a higher revenue per search than Microsoft or Yahoo. See
Search Marketing Communications, http://cohn.wordpress.com/category/revenue-per-visit/ (Feb 7,
2008) (link); Miguel Helft, A Long-Delayed Ad System Has Yahoo Crossing Its Fingers, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2007, at C1.
46
Facebook’s implied market value after investments by Microsoft and Chinese billionaire Li Kashing is $15 billion; that suggests that at least some investors are betting that Facebook will become the
leading social network. See Suzy Jagger, Li Ka-shing makes big impression on Facebook, THE TIMES
ONLINE,
Mar.
29,
2008,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/technology/article3642805.ece
(link);
Thomas R. Eisenmann and Brian Feinstein, Facebook Platform, Harvard Business School Case Study
N2-808-128 (Mar. 18, 2008), at 1.
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Table 2. Shares of Market Leaders in Major Internet Platforms
Measure

Auctions Page Views

Search Searches

Social Networking
Page Views

Leading

Second

Leading

Second

Leading

Second

Platform

Platform

Platform

Platform

Platform

Platform

Google

Yahoo!

91%

4%

Google

eBay

MySpace

Bebo

79%

6%

43%

25%

Google

Yahoo!

Google

Fotolog

90%

2%

98%

1%

Google

Microsoft

Facebook

Countries
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
France
Germany

78%

6%

Baidu

Google

54%

19%

eBay

Delcampe

Google

Microsoft

Skyrock

99%

0%

82%

3%

78%

7%

eBay

Yatego
GmbH

Google

eBay

StudiVZ

Schueler

80%

6%

43%

12%

Facebook

Xanga

99%

0%
Hong Kong
India
Italy

50%

30%

Google

Yahoo!

Google

Facebook

81%

11%

87%

6%

Telecom
Italia

Netlog

Badoo

27%

23%

eBay

Bidplaza

Google

99%

0%

85%

3%
Japan

Yahoo

Google

Mixi

Google

49%

41%

62%

14%

Friendster

MySpace

58%

25%

Bebo

Facebook

81%

7%

Friendster

Facebook

54%

15%

Malaysia
Mexico

Google

Microsoft

89%

4%

New Zealand
Russia
Singapore

Yandex

Google

52%

32%
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Spain

eBay
94%

MercadoL
ibre

Google

Microsoft

Fotolog

93%

2%

50%

NHN

Lycos

CyWorld

65%

16%

97%

Paran.co
m Club

Microsoft

Yahoo!

3%
South Korea

Metroflog
9%

0%
Taiwan
UK

eBay
98%

Price-drop
tv

23%

16%

Google

eBay

Bebo

Facebook

74%

6%

40%

28%

Google

Yahoo!

MySpace

Facebook

0%
USA

eBay

Bidz

96%

1%

53%

17%

62%

21%

Worldwide

eBay

Taobao

Google

Yahoo!

MySpace

Facebook

57%

14%

62%

13%

17%

15%

Sources: comScore, MyMetrix Key Measures Report (Dec. 2007); comScore, MyMetrix qSearch 2.0 Key Measures Report (Dec. 2007).
Notes: The search figures are shares as reported by comScore. They include
searches on web sites where searches are primarily or exclusively used to search
within the site rather than generally on the internet. They also include searches on
sites where advertising is not featured. Shares of search engines used for general
searches on the internet and shares of search engines relevant to search advertising will likely be higher than the shares reported here. Social networking shares
are also as reported by comScore. They include blogging sites such as Blogger. If
these sites are excluded, the shares of the market leaders would be higher.

The web-economy is still young compared to other industries. Some
of the leading firms are not even a decade old. It remains to be seen
whether they maintain their leadership and the extent to which other platforms, through differentiation, can survive. Yahoo has long been a leading
portal and advertising platform, but its market value fell 33 percent between
January 31, 2007 and January 31, 2008. Following this decline, Microsoft
announced its desire to acquire Yahoo on February 1, 2008. Despite its past
success and enormous user base, some analysts concluded that Yahoo could
not succeed on its own.47 Other web giants have also encountered problems. The growth of eBay has slowed, and the company was undergoing a
47
See, e.g., Michael Liedtke, Microsoft Woo Yahoo?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 12, 2008, at
C1; Grouchy Geek, http://grouchygeek.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/02/01/yahoo-needs-microsofts-help/
(Feb. 1, 2008, 11:56 EST) (link); Claudine Beaumont, Fading Yahoo! Needs Microsoft rescue, THE
TELEGRAPH,
Feb
2,
2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/02/01/bcnmicro601.xml (link).
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shakeup in management in early 2008. It faces increased competition from
Amazon, Google, and other web properties that provide transaction platforms for businesses. The capital markets have also expressed profound
uncertainty over Google’s growth. Its share price fell by 34 percent between January 2, 2008 and April 17, 2008, the day it announced its first
quarter earnings.48 Google reported a 30 percent increase in quarterly profits that day and its stock increased by 23 percent by April 22, 2008. 49
III. COMPETITION AND REGULATORY POLICY
Antitrust scrutiny of the leading web-based platforms from around the
world was, and is, inevitable. This scrutiny has come, so far, either through
self-initiated investigations by competition authorities, through complaints
by their diverse stakeholders, or through complaints by their rivals.50 These
web-platforms have large shares of the segments in which they operate.
While one can debate whether these segments correspond to well-defined
antitrust markets, the competition authorities and complainants may take
these categories as a starting point. Under European Community law, a
firm can be considered dominant with a share as low as 40 percent.51 Many
of these platforms have segment shares that exceed 80 percent in many
countries. The European Commission suggested, in its case against Microsoft, that such “super-dominant firms” should receive even greater scrutiny;
some observers believe that the Court of First Instance has agreed with the
Commission in its Microsoft judgment.52 Under U.S. law, firms that have
market shares in excess of 60 percent are often considered to have monopoly power.53 Although it has become more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail

48
See Google Finance, Google Inc., http://finance.google.com/finance?q=NASDAQ:GOOG (follow
“compare” hyperlink, then follow “Zoom: 6m” hyperlink, then track the dates and corresponding share
prices on the graph). In fact, Google’s stock price had been stumbling since November, 2007. See Posting of Jim Kerstetter to CNET Tech News Blog, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9920376-7.html
(Apr. 16, 2008, 11:06 PDT) (link).
49
See Google Finance, supra note 48; Press Release, Google, Google Announces First Quarter
2008
Results
(April
17,
2008),
available
at
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/revenues_q108.html (link).
50
In keeping with the global focus of this article “complainants” is used to refer to parties that complain to a competition authority as well as plaintiffs in private actions, which is the dominant form of
antitrust enforcement in the United States.
51
See British Airways, PLC v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 211, 223–25; Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision of July 16, 2003, ¶ 227 (link).
52
See Renata B. Hesse, Microsoft and the Court of First Instance: What Does it All Mean?,
GLOBAL
COMPETITION
POLICY,
Oct.
3,
2007,
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?id=562&action=907 (link); Harry First, Strong
Spine, Weak Underbelly: The CFI Microsoft Decision, GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, Sept. 28, 2007,
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?id=555&action=907 (link).
53
See Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Some Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law, Address
Before the University of International Business and Economics Competition Law Center Conference on
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on various monopolization theories in the United States, the case law on tying products together and offering discounts for bundles of products continues to provide significant opportunities for plaintiffs to pursue cases.
The existence of indirect network effects and scale economies means
these platforms are competing in “winner-take-all” and “a few winners take
all” markets. That leads to aggressive struggles to win market share at the
expense of rivals. Competition authorities worry and rivals complain, however, when “tough” business tactics succeed in reducing the rivals’ sales,
thereby “foreclosing” them from the market. Complicating matters, competition authorities and courts have difficulty distinguishing pro-competitive
from anti-competitive business practices for multi-sided platforms. For example, as mentioned previously, multi-sided platforms often charge prices
that are below cost to customers on one or more sides of the platform. In
some circumstances these low prices drive out competition as a result of
what business strategists refer to as “envelopment.”54 Rivals who lack the
money-making side of the platform that subsidizes the money-losing product cannot survive.
Several competition and regulatory issues are likely to arise in the
coming years as a result of this antitrust scrutiny and given the probable
evolution of the web-based economy.
The emergence of impregnable monopolies. There are likely to be
concerns over the seeming monopolization of certain segments. It is possible that the web-economy will see a constant churning of its leading players. The fact that eBay and Yahoo have lost their once seeming
impregnability is consistent with the view that dominance is fleeting. However, the evolution of the web-economy thus far is also consistent with the
evolution of other industries in which it takes time for the winners to
emerge.55 If so, it is possible that a handful of firms will have nearmonopoly positions in certain segments and that those positions will be protected in part by indirect network effects and the scale economies resulting
from the ability to average fixed software and hardware costs across larger
communities. American antitrust policy recognizes that such monopoly is
the reward for successful investment and innovation.56 European Community (EC)-based competition policy views competition as the more desirable

Abuse
of
Dominance:
Theory
and
Practice,
(July
21,
2007),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.htm.
54
See Thomas R. Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker & Marshal W. Van Alstyne, Platform Envelopment
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Tech. & Operations Mgt. Unit, Working Paper No. 07-104, 2007) (manuscript at 3),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996852 (link).
55
See David S. Evans, Daniel D. Garcia Swartz & Bryan G. Martin-Keating, The Failure of ECommerce Business: A Surprise or Not? 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.1, 7 (2002); Michael Gort & Steven
Klepper, Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations, 92 Econ. J. 630, 331 and Table 3 (1982)
(on the decline in number of firms).
56
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
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outcome, and when that is not possible, it imposes significant obligations on
the dominant firm.57
Leveraging into adjacent markets. The structure of the web ecosystem
makes it likely that dominant firms will seek to move into related markets
for complementary products or services. Because these firms are based on
software platforms it is relatively easy to add new features and services.
For example, Google introduced its Google Checkout payment service in
competition with PayPal by extending its software platform, integrating
code into Google Product Search and bundling Google Checkout for merchants into AdWords for advertisers. Moreover, the leading web platforms
often provide complementary services. It is a well-established economics
proposition that a monopoly could make greater profit if it also owned
complementary monopolies or if it could replace these complementary monopolies with competitive markets.58 Therefore, assuming that competition
is not feasible, we would expect the dominant firms to attempt to establish
monopolies across more segments than is true today. That could happen
through mergers or through one dominant firm challenging another, as
Google is doing with eBay.
Access to facilities. Access to the other platforms and to the intellectual property that enables one platform to work together (“interoperate”)
with another are likely to be raised when, as is the case in the European
Community, the law is conducive to do so.59 One set of issues concerns access to a “closed platform.” The Apple iTunes/iPod platform is largely
closed. Apple does not encourage—and indeed seeks to prevent—other
music stores from making music available for iPods or for other device
makers to play music from iTunes. Although it could obtain indirect network effects from an open strategy, it has chosen a tightly integrated business software-hardware model. This issue is central to the recent European
Community cases against Apple.60 Other platforms close themselves in par57
Firms that are dominant are subject to the provisos of Article 82 EC Treaty which has been interpreted to prohibit various forms of tying, refusals to deal, bundled price rebates, pricing below cost, and
other activities. See RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 202–208 (5th ed., 2004) (discussing examples of abuse of dominance). In many of these cases the practices are essentially prohibited per se if the
firm is dominant—has a share of an antitrust market that is higher than forty percent or so. See British
Airways, PLC v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 211, 223–25; Wanadoo Interactive, Commission
Decision of July 16, 2003, ¶ 227.
58
See Michael A. Salinger, Introduction to Chapters VII and IX of Augustin Cournot, Mathematical
Principles of the Theory of Wealth, 4 Competition Policy Int’l 274, 280–82 (2008) (“Today, the fundamental distinction between horizontal and vertical effects is widely accepted by antitrust practioners.”).
59
The OpenGroup, a consortium that aims to facilitate interoperability, explains that interoperability is the ability to both exchange information and to use it. “Without a way to exchange information ...
[sic] high-tech systems literally can’t communicate with each other. And, if they can’t communicate,
they can’t work—interoperate—with each other.” The Open Group, Interoperability Matters,
http://www.opengroup.org/bus_area/interoperability/info1/IBinfo1.htm#what, (last visited Apr. 10,
2008).
60
See Keith Regan, iTunes Draws Ire of EU Commissioner, MACNEWSWORLD, Mar. 13, 2007,
http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/56255.html (link); Eric Bangeman, EU Commissioner Criticizes
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ticular dimensions. Facebook, for example, does not allow search engines
to crawl its website, and as a result, the content on this social networking
site is not available to searchers.
Another set of issues relates to portability of data. Web platforms derive benefits from the data they collect in a variety of ways. eBay’s “Feedback Forum” provides quality information on sellers that is valuable to
buyers. Users input a great deal of valuable personal information into social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook. Google retains data
on search queries that it can use to refine searches and deliver ads. In these
cases one could imagine competitors seeking access to this information under an “essential facilities” theory under European Community law.61 One
could also imagine competition policy cases over restrictions that prevent
users from exporting their data to competing sites. This battle has already
begun, as Facebook rivals are currently lobbying publicly for the portability
of social networking data.
Tying and bundling. As the current spate of cases suggests, it is probable that leading web platforms will face complaints over tying of various
forms.62 It is also a common business strategy for software platforms to expand by adding features. They face low marginal costs for doing so, they
can sometimes provide efficiencies by integrating features together or making it easier for consumers to obtain them more conveniently, and they can
aggregate demand over users who may value one feature but not another.63
The D.C. Court of Appeals found that it was appropriate to apply a rule-of-

iPod-iTunes Tie-in, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 11, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070311-eucommissioner-criticizes-ipod-itunes-tie-in.html (link).
61
“[T]he essential facilities doctrine imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential
facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain
in order to compete with the first.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th
Cir. 1991). For a review of the implementation of the essential facilities doctrine by the European Union, see James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179 (2005)
(link).
62
For example, in September 2007, The European Court of First Instance (CFI) upheld the European Commission’s accusations against Microsoft of illegal tying of the Windows Client PC Operating
System and Windows Media Player. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 ECJ CELEX
LEXIS 554 (Sept. 14, 2007). Further, in January 2008, the Commission opened an investigation into the
alleged tying of Internet Explorer and other software products to the Windows PC operating system. See
Memorandum from the European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Initiates Formal Investigations
Against Microsoft in Two Cases of Suspected Abuse of Dominant Market Position (Jan. 14, 2008)
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/19. The Commission
has also censured Apple for its tying of the iPod music player and the iTunes Music Store. See Regan,
supra note 60; Bangeman, supra note 60.
63
See EVANS, HAGIU & SCHMALENSEE (2006), supra note 38, at ch. 11. Demand aggregation is
most easily seen with newspapers: many people only read portions of the newspapers; however, by offering various features readers find enough content to persuade them to subscribe to the newspaper.
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reason legal standard to tying for software platforms64 because of the possibility that there were particularly compelling efficiency explanations for the
practice in this situation.65 Whether the U.S. courts treat the web-based
companies as software platforms, however, remains to be seen; these companies have different business models and practices than Microsoft did with
Windows, which was the subject of the D.C. Circuit decision. Moreover,
the European Community’s Court of First Instance has re-affirmed the
Community’s formalistic approach to tying in the Microsoft judgment.66
Envelopment and predation. Multi-sided platforms are a bit like
clumsy giants stepping on other creatures as they move through the ecosystem. Although they may crush competitors intentionally, this may also
happen as a natural byproduct of legitimate pricing and design decisions.
Multi-sided platforms—and this is particularly true with the leading web
platforms—give many features and services away, often for the purpose of
attracting traffic. They can readily crush companies that charge for features
and services they offer for free. But it is not only the little guy that faces
concern from this strategy. Google Checkout can undercut eBay’s PayPal
because Google, unlike eBay, can obtain more advertising revenue from
having an efficient payment method and can secure data that it can use to
target ads better. Likewise, Google’s ability to subsidize software with advertising poses a threat to Microsoft and other software companies that
charge for software; Microsoft is moving rapidly into online advertising just
so that it can have a source of revenue similar to a key rival. Nevertheless,
one would expect that tying, bundling and pricing strategies that foreclose
rivals will lead to competition policy investigations and prosecutions.
CONCLUSIONS
At the inception of most new industries, hundreds of firms enter.67
They battle it out over time. A few winners usually emerge—firms that
have secured scale economies or that have benefited from superior management or both. This pattern has been repeated numerous times over the
course of the second industrial revolution that started after the U.S. Civil
War. Consider the automobile industry. It began with the invention of the
automobile by Karl Benz in 1885. The first commercial automobile company in the United States was Duryea, which entered the market in 1893.
As of 1908, 253 automobile companies were competing in the U.S. This
64
“A rule-of-reason analysis requires first checking whether the facts of a given case suggest that
anti-competitive tying is a possibility and then weighing those anti-competitive effects with the benefits
resulting from a tying policy.” See David S. Evans, A. Jorge Padilla & Michele Polo, Tying in Platform
Software: Reasons for a Rule-of-Reason Standard in European Competition Law, 25 WORLD
COMPETITION 509, 514 (2002).
65
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
66
See Christian Ahlborn & David S. Evans, The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for the
Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe, ANTITRUST L. J., (forthcoming 2008).
67
See Gort & Klepper, supra note 55 at 631.
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was whittled down to the big four—General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and
American Motors—by 1960. Many other industries followed a similar
course.
Antitrust scrutiny often follows consolidation. The leaders in the industry have large market shares, which, under longstanding antitrust practice, makes them vulnerable to claims of unlawfully maintaining or
acquiring a monopoly or running afoul of other antitrust laws that have a
market power screen. AT&T was hit with its first major antitrust case in
1911, twenty-six years after it opened the first telephone exchange. IBM
faced its first antitrust case forty-seven years after it received patents for the
punch card machine.
We can expect the web-based industries will follow the same trajectory, and thus far they have. Massive entry has taken place. As with many
new industries, we remember the YouTubes that succeeded but we forget
that Google Video and hundreds of other start-ups tried and quickly failed.
There are some differences, though, which suggest more antitrust controversy will result, sooner. The first is speed. Although the notion of “Internet Time” may have been exaggerated, it is true that web-based firms can
achieve leading positions in many countries around the world very quickly.
The second is complexity. Almost all of the leading web-based firms have
intricate multi-sided business models. The third is interconnectedness. The
web-economy is interconnected, which leads to dependencies and rivalries
that can create conflict and antitrust complaints.
As a result, the competition authorities and courts will have a challenging set of issues to deal with concerning the web-based economy in the
years to come. The future will bring merger cases as firms seek to consolidate to achieve economies of scale and indirect network effects; refusal-todeal cases as closed platforms deny others access to their communities; predation cases as rivals complain about “free” offerings that foreclose if not
destroy them; tying cases as platforms use software platform technologies
to add features and functions which in some cases will foreclose their rivals; and exclusive dealing cases as platforms lock up traffic to achieve indirect network effects. Courts and competition authorities should exercise
care in balancing the need to protect long-run social welfare against the
need to stop anti-competitive strategies in this highly dynamic and complex
part of the economy.
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